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This article examines historical transformations of Japanese collective memory of the
atomic bombing of Hiroshima by utilizing a theoretical framework that combines a
model of reiterated problem solving and a theory of cultural trauma. I illustrate how
the event of the nuclear fallout in March 1954 allowed actors to consolidate previously
fragmented commemorative practices into a master frame to define the postwar
Japanese identity in terms of transnational commemoration of “Hiroshima.” I also
show that nationalization of trauma of “Hiroshima” involved a shift from pity to
sympathy in structures of feeling about the event. This historical study suggests that a
reiterated problem-solving approach can be efficacious in analyzing how construction
of national memory of a traumatic event connects with the recurrent reworking
of national identity, on the one hand, and how a theory of cultural trauma can
be helpful in exploring a synthesis of psychological and sociological approaches to
commemoration of a traumatic event, on the other.
Today, 60 years after the atomic bombing, “Hiroshima” occupies a prominent place in
Japanese national memory and forms the core of the national identity that renounces
war as a sovereign right. The Peace Memorial Ceremony in Hiroshima makes news
headlines every August in the Japanese media, and more than 1 million people pay
their visit to the Peace Memorial Park, the “Mecca of Peace,” every year. It is
therefore surprising to learn that “Hiroshima” was once almost forgotten in the
aftermath of World War II. Japanese were able to commemorate “Hiroshima” as
national trauma only after one Japanese fishing boat was struck by the fallout of
the hydrogen bomb near Bikini Atoll in March 1954. But what caused this delayed
register of “Hiroshima” in Japanese collective memory? How did the event of the
H-bomb fallout transform commemoration of “Hiroshima?”
To answer these questions, I first assemble a theoretical framework for the study of
collective memory that combines a model of reiterated problem solving and a theory
of cultural trauma. Collective memory is part and parcel of collective identity because
memory is a precondition for narrative construction of autobiographies by which we
identify who we are. As historical circumstances change, we reconstruct our collec-
tive memory and redefine our collective identity. This recurrent reworking of collec-
tive memory and identity makes it possible for us to conceptualize the history of
collective remembering as the reiterated solving of an enduring problem—how to re-
member the past so as to define identity of members of a collectivity—where earlier
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solutions set parameters for current competition among possible solutions. Moreover,
a traumatic event has an important role in construction of collective memory and
identity, for it violently disrupts processes of memory construction and shakes existen-
tially the sense of who we are. It is therefore helpful to introduce a theory of cultural
trauma into the study of collective memory and shed light on a sociopsychological
dimension of the remembering. In particular, as we shall see, commemoration of a
traumatic event is a critical case to test an analytical strategy of “multidimensional
rapprochement” between psychological-individualist and sociological-collectivist ap-
proaches to collective memory (Olick 1999b). Thus, a theory of collective memory
that incorporates reiterated problem solving and cultural trauma can give us new
analytical leverage to study how commemorative practices build on one another and
how a traumatic event plays out in memory-identity formation of a collectivity.
Within this theoretical framework, I examine the historical transformations of
Japanese collective memory of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima between August
1945, when the atom bomb was dropped, and April 1957, when the Japanese state
officially “nationalized” memories of the atomic bombing by providing medical care
for A-bomb survivors (hibakusha), living testimonials of the event. I break down
the 12 years into three periods in which actors articulated different solutions to the
problem of commemoration of “Hiroshima” vis-à-vis Japanese national identity. I fo-
cus on how the earliest solution to remember “Hiroshima” as transnational affected
subsequent solutions, and how actors succeeded in transforming the lock-in transna-
tional commemorative path in conjunction with the contingent event of the H-bomb
fallout in March 1954. I then show how the atomic bombing of Hiroshima became
national trauma constitutive of Japanese identity by pointing out a shift from pity
to sympathy in structures of feeling about the event. I suggest that this shift signaled
the emergence of national trauma, converting Japanese from spectators of distant
suffering to a community of wounded actors.
COMMEMORATION AS REITERATED PROBLEM SOLVING
One theoretical point of departure for this article is Jeffrey Olick’s (1999a) threefold
model of collective memory. Olick considers three key dimensions: the politics, the
history, and the memory of commemoration. The first dimension, the “politics of
commemoration,” pertains to the present, conjunctural processes through which dif-
ferent social groups engage in the reshaping of collective memory of a given event.
Here, “quintessential sociological issues of power, stratification, and contestation are
central” (Olick and Robbins 1998:122). The second dimension is the “history of com-
memoration,” concerned with change in forms of communication that are available
to construction of collective memory. Mnemonic representations are always con-
structed, circulated, and stored in particular forms, such as “narratives, pictorial im-
ages, textbooks, pamphlets, legal charters, wills, diaries, and statues” (Wagner-Pacifici
1996:302), and different forms structure a range of publics into which particular com-
memorative practices flow. The third dimension is the “memory of commemoration,”
that is, “prosaic path-dependence” (Olick 1999a), which creates internal dynamics
within the history of collective memory that constrain the present recommemora-
tion. “Once commemoration gets underway,” in other words, “it picks up steam; it
operates by a logic and force of its own” (Schudson 1989:108).
This third dimension is a crucial innovation that corrects the strong presentist bias
in previous work on collective memory (Halbwachs 1992). It is now widely accepted
that the present interests of social groups cannot dictate reconstruction of collective
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memory, for collective memory can only be reshaped within limits that are dependent
on the past of commemoration (Coser 1992; Olick 1998, 1999a; Olick and Levy 1997;
Schudson 1989; Schwartz 1982, 1991, 1996). In fact, invoking path dependence has
become standard for sociologists of collective memory; for instance, Barry Schwartz,
one of the leading figures in the field, argues “the earliest construction of an historical
object limits the range of things subsequent generations can do with it” (1991:232).
In a similar vein, Olick introduces the dimension of “prosaic path-dependence” in
order to capture “the accumulated succession of commemorations” (1999a:383).
Nonetheless, it is precisely this third dimension of path dependence that I propose
to modify with a model of “reiterated problem solving” (Haydu 1998). This is not
simply because discussions of path dependence in sociology have been hampered by
a lack of clear understanding of the meaning of path dependence (Mahoney 2000).
More importantly, reiterated problem solving can be more efficacious than path de-
pendence in studying mechanisms through which “succession of commemorations”
accumulates through time, weighs on the present recommemoration, and sometimes
transforms its lock-in path in conjunction with a contingent event (Sewell 1996) by
capturing complex interactions between structure, agency, and contingency in mo-
ments of remembering.
According to Jeffrey Haydu, this model of “reiterated problem solving” links
facts from different periods into larger sequences of problem solving. Periods
are demarcated on the basis of contrasting solutions for recurring problems . . . .
Continuities across temporal cases can be traced in part to enduring problems,
while more or less contingent solutions to those problems are seen as reflecting
and regenerating the historical individuality of each period. (1998:354)
From this problem-solving perspective, one of the main explanatory goals is to ac-
count for why at a given time actors pursued one solution—one particular way of
commemoration—rather than another. In order to achieve this explanatory goal, a
problem-solving approach considers how a solution at an earlier point in history sets
a new historical direction and limits future choices.
At first glance, this resembles the notion of path dependence, but the former is
distinct from the latter on a crucial point: conceiving outcomes at a given switch
point in terms of problem solving forces us to pay greater attention to agency and
subjectivity of historical actors. A problem-solving account can shed light on con-
trasts not only in the conjunctural workings of structures but also in social actors’
own understandings, that is, “how social actors constructed the problem and what
solutions appeared to be realistic within each historical context” (Haydu 1998: 355).
This greater focus of a problem-solving model on action is critical. If we concep-
tualize actions as events, we can examine them as points in time where underlying
mechanisms and their interactions register their causal forces through the mediation
of agency of human actors as problem solvers (Abrams 1982; Collier 1994; Haydu
1998; Sewell 1996; Steinmetz 1998). Thus, I suggest that a problem-solving approach
can be analytically more potent to answer the question: “In what different ways can
the remembered past constrain the present, and under what circumstances are such
constraints transformable?” (Olick and Levy 1997:922).
This model of reiterated problem solving can be particularly useful in studying
commemoration of a past event as a locus of articulation of national identity. As
Olick points out, construction of collective memory is tied to delineation of group
membership: “It is not just that we remember as members of groups, but that we
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constitute those groups and their members simultaneously in the act (thus re-member-
ing)” (1999b:342). More pithily, Max Weber once defined nation as a “community
of memories” (1978:903). Memory is fundamental to narrative construction of who
we are, our autobiographical selves. Accordingly, kinds of mnemonic representations
of the past by which we define our social identities, who we are collectively, are
constitutive of national grouping.
In the world of nation-states, collective memory becomes part of constant recuper-
ation of nationalism. The tenacity of nationalism derives from its practices to define
nation in terms of its “internal frontier” that constitutes the putatively invisible and
elastic “essence” of a people, which enables perpetual redefinition of nation accord-
ing to changing historical circumstances (Balibar 1991; Stoler 1995). The “essence”
of national identity, such as “Japaneseness,” is an “empty signifier” whose content
can be resignified over and again (Barthes [1957] 1987; Laclau and Mouffe [1985]
2001) through reconstruction of memories of who “we the people” have been. Here,
this recuperative operation of nationalism into which collective memory is recruited
can be conceptualized as reiterated problem solving, where actors select one way of
remembering rather than another.
In examining this relationship between collective memory and national identity,
we need to expand on the second dimension of Olick’s model, the “history of com-
memoration.” It is not only forms of memory but also their “carrying capacities”
(Hilgartner and Bosk 1988:58–61) that we should examine in order to understand
how mnemonic representations disseminate across different social spaces. For exam-
ple, news magazines tend to have a greater carrying capacity than academic books,
for the former are economically and culturally more accessible than the latter. Na-
tionalization of commemoration of a particular event depends on the availability
of mediums capable of reaching a wide range of audiences. Without sufficient car-
rying capacities, memory forms cannot impose on people within a territory of a
nation-state “simultaneity-in-time,” a hallmark of an imagined community (Ander-
son 1991), around an anniversary of a given event. It is therefore critical to study how
mediums of memory with different carrying capacities participate in anniversariza-
tion and dissemination of simultaneity in nationalizing a certain commemorative
practice.
CULTURAL TRAUMA AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
In this process of conjoining collective memory and national identity, “cultural
trauma” plays an important role. In Jeffrey Alexander’s formulation, cultural trauma
occurs “when members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to a horrendous
event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their mem-
ories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways”
(2004:1). Cultural trauma is inextricably coupled with issues of collective identity. It
rattles default notions of what it means to be a member of a certain community
and calls for their rearticulation (Zelizer 2002). When it meets nationalism, cultural
trauma can be congealed into “founding trauma” that “typically plays a tendentious
ideological role, for example, in terms of the concept of a chosen people” (LaCapra
2001:81). That is, cultural trauma can be appropriated by nationalists to give a spe-
cial mission to their nation, for the “most energetic manifestations of the idea [of
nation] . . . have contained the legend of a providential ‘mission’” (Weber 1978:925).
As we shall see, “Hiroshima” became exactly such a foundational trauma in postwar
Japan.
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In conceptualizing “trauma” at the level of collective memory, we should be careful
not to commit what Alexander calls the “naturalist fallacy” (2004). At the individual
level, trauma is generally defined as a psychic injury caused by an overwhelming ex-
perience of a catastrophic event, where the memory of the event is repressed and the
response occurs in an often delayed, uncontrolled repetitive fashion (Caruth 1996:11;
Olick 1999b:343; Schudson 1989:110; see Payne et al. 2004, for a review). The natu-
ralist fallacy means analogically transferring the psychoanalytic model of individual
trauma to the study of collective memory. Examples of this fallacy are often found in
writings by leading historians and literary critics of psychoanalytic persuasion, such
as Dominick LaCapra and Cathy Caruth. For instance, both of them interpret the
belated register of trauma in collective memory by invoking psychoanalytic theory.
“The traumatic event is repressed or denied and registers only belatedly after the pas-
sage of a period of latency. This effect of belatedness has of course been a manifest
aspect of the Holocaust” (LaCapra 1998:9). According to Caruth, this “temporal de-
lay” is not limited to the Holocaust but can be found in traumatic events in general
(1995).
Although their applications of psychoanalysis look suggestive at first glance, they
ignore the fact that construction of collective memory is distinct from that of in-
dividual memory. When theorists state that collectivities “remember,” “forget,” or
“repress” without adjustments in method and theory in crossing the distinction be-
tween the individual and the collective, their statements can be misleading. So-called
delayed collective memory of a traumatic event like the Holocaust might have more
to do with “political interest and opportunities than the persistence of trauma or with
any ‘linkage’ in the collective unconscious” (Kansteiner 2002:187). Thus, we need to
examine cultural, social, and political processes through which collective memories
of traumatic events are constructed; we must maintain the distinction between “col-
lected” and “collective” memories, that is, “socially framed individual memories and
collective commemorative representations and mnemonic traces” (Olick 1999b:336).
Typically, psychoanalysis or psychology is concerned with the former, and sociology
with the latter, though a quantitative survey of collective memory in sociology (e.g.,
Schuman and Scott 1989) collects socially framed individual memories.
However, it is equally problematic to draw too sharp a distinction between in-
dividual and collective memories. As Olick proposes, we should instead try to pay
attention to “a wide variety of mnemonic processes, practices, and outcomes, neuro-
logical, cognitive, personal, aggregated, and collective” (1999b:346)—complex inter-
actions between collected and collective memories. In examining the so-called belated
register of a traumatic event in collective memory, for instance, we should not dis-
miss the utility of psychoanalysis and psychology outright in favor of sociology, for
denial, repression, and silence on the part of individual survivors in the aftermath
of a traumatic event could delay their actions to present their traumatic experiences
in public arenas.
Here, I suggest that we adopt what critical-realist philosopher of science Roy
Bhaskar calls “a linking science ‘socio-psychology’,” an intermediate domain be-
tween social sciences and psychology ([1989] 1998:216). This synthetic and interme-
diate science between sociology and psychology may be alternatively called “psycho-
sociology” (Oughourlian [1982] 1991). Either way, it acknowledges and aims to study
the inseparable relationship between sociogenesis and psychogenesis in a nonreduc-
tionistically synthetic manner. Within this framework, we can take into account both
sociological and psychological mechanisms, as well as their interactions, through
which collective memories are (re)produced and transformed. Since traumatic events
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cause strong psychological reactions, the study of commemoration of such events
is the best place to experiment with a sociopsychology of collective memory—an
analytical strategy of “multidimensional rapprochement between individualist and
collectivist approaches” (Olick 1999b:333)
Thus, from a sociopsychological perspective, we need to modify a sociological
theory of cultural trauma. Alexander maintains that cultural trauma “is not the result
of a group experiencing pain. It is the result of this acute discomfort entering into
the core of the collectivity’s sense of its own identity” by defining cultural trauma
as discursively constructed and distinct from psychic trauma (2004:10). But it is
implicit in Alexander’s argument that cultural trauma has an emotional and therefore
psychological dimension, which cannot be reduced to discursive construction. As
anthropologist Margot Lyon argues, a constructionist approach to emotion has real
limitations because emotion “has a central role in bodily agency, for by its very nature
it links the somatic and the communicative aspects of being and thus encompasses
bodily as well as social and cultural domains” (1995:256). So, what does it mean to
say discomfort or pain enters into collective identity, when it is always only individual
members of a collectivity who can feel emotion?
In working out this analytical tension between psychological-individualist and
sociological-collectivist approaches to cultural trauma, Raymond Williams’s sugges-
tive but underdeveloped concept of “structures of feeling” (1977:132–33) provides one
possible direction. Here, I define “structures of feeling” as consisting of rules reg-
ulating the sequence: stimulus event → emotion ≈ feeling → action tendency ≈
response. In this processual model (Damasio 1999; Elster 1999; see Lewis and
Haviland-Jones 2000, for reviews), an event stimulates emotion, a neurophysiolog-
ical state, which includes a distinct pattern in an autonomic nervous system and a
motor behavior (Ekman and Davidson 1994). This emotional state is phenomeno-
logically experienced as a feeling, that is, an emotional experience. An emotional
(neurophysiological) state and an experience of that state then prepare the human
organism to take an action in response to the stimulus event. Stimuli can come from
either the environment or the organism’s memory, and a single stimulus event can
arouse multiple emotions simultaneously.
In this sequence, structures of feeling mediate (i) which stimulus event elicits which
emotion, (ii) linguistic articulation of an emotional state as a feeling or an emotional
experience, and (iii) which emotion/feeling induces which action response. The first
point of cultural mediation is more or less the same as what Arlie Hochschild calls
“feeling rules” (1979, [1983] 2003). Mnemonic practices define an actor’s appropriate
emotional response to a given stimulus event like a representation of the past event;
cultural practices specify which symbol or image is expected to evoke which emo-
tion/feeling. In addition, cultural practices demarcate categories of emotions, such
as anger, disgust, fear, guilt, pride, sadness, shame, and so on. With the help of these
categories, the actor can be experientially aware of his or her emotion that is above
defined as a neurophysiological state. Finally, the actor learns to take a certain action
that is deemed culturally appropriate as a response to a particular emotion evoked by
a representation of the past event. This can be called rules of acting-out or “display
rules” (Ekman and Friesen 1969) sanctioned by institutions. In short, (i), (ii), and
(iii) together comprise, as it were, “structures of feeling about cultural trauma.”
Construction of cultural trauma can be conceived as a process in which actors
appropriate structures of feeling about mnemonic representations of a certain event.
In this process of “mnemonic socialization” (Zerubavel 1996), rituals play an im-
portant role, for they create a momentary “communitas” in which participants can
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experience heightened feelings of togetherness (Turner 1969). Successful “interaction
ritual chains” increase “emotional energy” of individuals and produce “high ritual
density” of a group, resulting in “collective effervescence” (Collins 2001). Hence
mnemonic representations become emotionally charged when they are a locus of rit-
ual; an object makes a vivid and lasting impression upon an individual when his or
her encounter with it involves strong emotion. Collective effervescence in rituals that
focus on mnemonic representations of a certain event therefore reinforce structures
of feeling—rules of feeling and display—about those mnemonic symbols and images:
“the ingredients of group assembly, emotional contagion, and mutual focus generate
respect for symbolic objects” (Collins 2004:67).
I propose that we understand the emergence of cultural trauma in terms of a shift
in structures of feeling about a traumatic event from “pity” to “sympathy” among
members of a given group who have not been directed exposed to it. As French
sociologist Luc Boltanski (1999) argues, drawing on Hannah Arendt’s discussion
of politics of pity, “pity” is the default feeling of the spectator of trauma, which
preserves a distance between the spectator and the sufferer. When “pity” dominates
structures of feeling about a traumatic event among group members who are not
direct survivors, psychological trauma that the event inflicted upon survivors remains
individual. When historical developments allow the other group members to define
their emotional relationship with the survivors in terms of “sympathy” instead of
“pity,” however, cultural trauma emerges at the collective level, which is more than
the individual survivor’s psychic injury; the other members define their collective
identity as the actor who shares the survivor’s wound, not the spectator of the distant
suffering. Of course, this does not necessarily mean that all the other members of the
group actually feel sympathy and solidarity with the victims. This shift from “pity”
to “sympathy” is essentially a structural one, that is, a change in structures of feeling.
The potential contribution of this sociopsychological model of structures of feel-
ing is twofold. One is that it offers a framework in which we might synthesize
psychological-individual and sociological-collective approaches to the study of com-
memoration of a traumatic event. Another is that the model sheds light on the role of
emotion in commemoration of a traumatic event, which has been understudied in the
field of collective memory (Harkin 2003; White 2000). Of course, it is impossible for
us to have unmediated access to people’s emotional states in the past. What we can
do is to reconstruct meanings of discursive practices that expressed certain emotional
states according to the cultural logic(s) at the time. Historical relics, such as jour-
nals, newspaper articles, and poems, contain traces of emotions—confessional and
circumstantial evidences by which we can make inferences about people’s emotional
states.
REITERATED COMMEMORATION OF “HIROSHIMA”
With these analytical tools at hand, I examine historical transformations of Japanese
collective memory of “Hiroshima” between August 1945, when the bomb was
dropped, and April 1957, when medical treatment of A-bomb survivors—human
reminders and remainders of the atomic bombing—was institutionalized as a project
of the Japanese nation-state. In tracing transformations of commemoration of
“Hiroshima,” I divide the 12 years between 1945 and 1957 into three periods that
were marked by different structures of commemoration. In light of a model of reit-
erated problem solving, I focus on how actors articulated solutions to the recurring
problem of the remembering of “Hiroshima” and how these solutions interacted with
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and built on each other across different periods of time. I also incorporate a theory
of cultural trauma to examine the historical development of structures of feeling
about “Hiroshima” and suggest that a sociopsychological approach is helpful for the
study of collective memory.
The following analysis of a history of commemoration of “Hiroshima” is centered
on three kinds of data. The first set of data consists of writings, such as memoirs
and petitions, produced by survivors. These materials shed light on how survivors
tried (or refused) to present their experiences. The second is archival materials that
document public and political practices in the locality of Hiroshima. These include
peace declarations reiterated by different mayors of Hiroshima at the Peace Memorial
Ceremony on August 6 every year and articles published by the major local newspa-
per Chugoku Shinbun. The third category of data pertains to a history of public and
political practices at the national level, including major national newspapers, maga-
zines, and the Diet proceedings. I interpret these data—interactions among these three
layers and their transformations—against a backdrop of historical circumstances of
postwar Japan and international relations.1
Transnational Hiroshima, August 1945–August 1951
The Japanese media initially reacted to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima by inciting
anger. On August 8, two days after the bombing, the two major national newspapers,
Asahi Shinbun and Yomiuri Shinbun, reported that the enemy’s “new bomb” had
been dropped in Hiroshima. The “atrocious effect” of the new bomb was publicized,
instigating anger toward the United States. On August 11, the imperial government
publicly accused the United States of violating the rules of the Hague Tribunal, which
banned the deployment of inhumane weapons. Both Asahi Shinbun and Yomiuri
Shinbun also condemned the bombing as an act “against civilization and humanity.”
Thus, the leading actors in political and public arenas tried to structure feelings
about the bombing as those of the unjustly victimized.
But angry protests against the United States quickly dissipated from the public
and political arenas after Japan surrendered to the United States on August 15.
Censorship was imposed on September 19 by the General Headquarters (GHQ),
headed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Douglas MacArthur.
This censorship, called the “Press Code,” banned publication of damages of the
atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As a result, most of the Japanese
who had not witnessed the atomic bombing were kept uninformed of the scale of
destruction that the atom bombs had inflicted upon the two cities. Besides, even
after the Japanese came to know that Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been bombed
by atomic weapons, they were reluctant to treat the two cities differently from other
cities destroyed by fire bombs. For instance, a few members of the Diet insisted that
Tokyo be not treated differently from Hiroshima and Nagasaki because, though not
1Due to the limited space, I shall leave out two issues: Japanese collective memory of the atomic
bombing of Nagasaki and American collective memory of the atomic bombings. In Japan, it is generally
acknowledged that people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki have different commemorative styles. A well-known
phrase sums up differences between the two: “Raging Hiroshima, Praying Nagasaki.” It may be worthwhile
to study differences and interactions between commemorative practices of the two cities. It may be also
interesting to study mnemonic representations of the atomic bombings in the United States. The legacy
of “Hiroshima and Nagasaki” can be seen as a “difficult past” (Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz 1991) or
a “difficult reputation” (Fine 2001) for Americans. As Vera Zolberg (1998) shows in her study of the
Enola Gay Exhibition dispute that occurred in the mid-1990s, American commemoration of the atomic
bombings is a politically contentious issue (also see Lifton and Mitchell 1995).
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atom-bombed, casualties the former had suffered were “three times larger” than the
latter (7th Lower House Construction Committee # 16, March 24, 1950; 7th Upper
House Construction and Local Administration Joint Committee # 5, April 6, 1950).
In the beginning, the “A-bomb survivor” was only locally visible in medical orga-
nizations in Hiroshima that treated A-bomb casualties, though those organizations
themselves were devastated by the bomb. The existence of the “A-bomb survivor”
was confined to the local medical arena, not even entering into the local political
discourse. When local politicians discussed the “atom bomb” (if not the “A-bomb
survivor”), they framed it as a problem for all of humanity in terms of its destructive
potential. Those who died of the atom bomb were identified not so much as Japanese
as citizens of Hiroshima who were considered members of humanity; at this point,
association of “Hiroshima” with a particular nation was virtually nonexistent (Orr
2001; Yoneyama 1999). In other words, although the city of Hiroshima was physi-
cally located in Japan, the city and its experience of the atom bomb were presented
as transnational and beyond territorialization by the Japanese nation-state. During
this period, all the peace declarations read at the Peace Memorial Ceremony ex-
pressed aspirations for transnational commemoration of the atomic bombing. Mayor
Hamai stated on August 6, 1948, for example: “We, the citizens of Hiroshima, hold
this solemn Peace Memorial Service to convey this lesson to the whole world.”2 His
speech was devoid of direct reference to Japanese nationality, insisting on transna-
tional remembering.
This practice of transnational commemoration was induced by the Occupation.
Local actors in Hiroshima were discouraged by GHQ’s censorship from framing
memories of the atomic bombing in political terms. For instance, the Peace Memo-
rial Ceremony in 1950 was canceled due to pressure from GHQ because some groups
of the participants were planning to use the occasion to protest against the Korean
War. Since GHQ did not allow the presentist interests to appropriate “Hiroshima”
for explicitly political purposes, the local actors chose to commemorate “Hiroshima”
in more abstract and universalistic terms. This tendency was also evidenced by dis-
cussions surrounding the Peace Memorial City Construction Bill. In December 1948,
Mayor Hamai submitted a petition to the Diet that proposed Hiroshima be desig-
nated as a city to commemorate the atomic bombing as a foundation for future
world peace. He emphasized the “epoch-making” significance of the event in human
history and argued that reconstruction of Hiroshima as a peace memorial city would
be “the greatest contribution to humankind” (Hiroshima City 1982:237).
It is important to note that it was the Japanese people who could make “the great-
est contribution to humankind” by reconstructing Hiroshima as a peace memorial
city, even though this nationalist point was not stressed in the political discussions.
Political actors like Hamai might have been aware that “Hiroshima” had a poten-
tial to become Japan’s great symbolic capital in the arena of international relations;
the number of letters from organizations abroad (e.g., the United States, Britain,
Germany, Australia, India, and France) to the mayor increased from 16 in 1947 to
357 in 1951 (see Ubuki 1992:97, for detailed statistics). Members of the Diet saw
that Japan could combine its so-called Peace Constitution, which renounced war as
a sovereign right, with the experience of the atomic bombings (Chugoku Shinbun
Hiroshima Fiftieth Anniversary Report Group 1995:23–26) so as to promote a new
2All the English translations of the peace declarations that I quote in this article were generously
provided by Hiroshima City. Japanese copies of all the peace declarations in the past (1947–2004) are now
available online from the city’s website: http://www.city.hiroshima.jp/shimin/heiwa/heiwasengen.html.
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image of Japan as a peace-loving country. Although transnational commemoration
of “Hiroshima” was prevalent and the majority of Japanese were not well informed
about the atomic bombings, politicians foresaw that “Hiroshima” could be a rallying
point to refashion Japanese national identity from the prewar militarist to the post-
war pacifist. They did not emphasize this nationalist appropriation of “Hiroshima,”
however, because they feared a potential intervention from GHQ (Chugoku Shinbun
Hiroshima Fiftieth Anniversary Report Group 1995: 24). Besides, the politicians were
preoccupied with the more urgent political agenda of rebuilding the socioeconomic
system of Japan devastated by the war.
In addition, the peace declarations at the Peace Memorial Ceremony during this
period focused on lives of citizens that were “claimed,” “thrown away,” and “lost,”
that is, dead. A dominant frame to commemorate the dead was one of teleology.
The oft-quoted cliché went: “the precious sacrifice of those victimized by the atomic
bombings have laid a firm foundation for Japan’s postwar peace and prosperity”
(Yoneyama 1999:144). This commemorative practice to give teleological meaning to
the atom bomb dead was part and parcel of the “foundational narrative” of postwar
Japan (Igarashi 2000), which emphasized progression from the prewar to the postwar
in terms of its peace and prosperity, downplaying the interruption of the war. The
teleological remembering of the dead allowed Japanese not only to leave the past
behind but also to bury survivors with the dead. For example, Mayor Hamai stated
at the Peace Memorial Ceremony on August 6 1949: “Today is the fourth occasion on
which we, the citizens of Hiroshima, have remembered our dead. We earnestly pray
that such a tragedy will never occur on the earth again.” Here, what was remembered
were the dead and this “tragedy” was regarded as already over (so that they could
pray that another one would never occur). In this context, the “A-bomb survivor,”
the unfinished tragedy, became invisible. In fact, until 1954, peace declarations at the
Ceremony did not acknowledge the existence of survivors.
Another characteristic of commemoration of “Hiroshima” during this period was
a peculiar logic of the perpetrator. The atom bomb was conceived as an “actor” in
its own right and framed as possessing agency. When Mayor Hamai discussed the
devastation of the city at the Peace Memorial Ceremony, he talked as if the atom
bomb had fallen independently of Japanese and American military operations. He
almost always used passive voice sentences, such as “our Hiroshima was devastated
in an instance by the first-ever atom bomb” (August 6, 1947) without reference to
nationalities, so as to blur the geopolitical origin of the bombing. This was true of
national political actors as well. In discussing the Hiroshima Peace Memorial City
Construction Bill, one member of the Diet repeated the somewhat awkward sentence
“the atom bombs fell” (10th Upper House Construction Committee #4, February 20,
1951), treating them as subjects. In other words, the atomic bombing was represented
as a natural disaster rather than a human wrong and thereby experienced as an act
of God or a whim of nature, which consequently deflected discussion of culpability
and responsibility (cf. Erikson 1995:191).
This Japanese victimhood-without-perpetrator was correlated with the postwar im-
age of the United States as a benevolent liberator instead of a hateful former enemy.
In November 1946, Licensed Agencies for Relief in Asia (organized by religious or-
ganizations and labor unions in the United States) started sending relief to Japan,
which continued until June 1952. In 1949, the American activist Norman Cousins
initiated the program of moral adoptions of “A-bomb orphans.” (They were chil-
dren who had lost their parents to the atom bombs while they had been taking
refuge in the countryside to avoid the danger of air raids.) Above all, it is well docu-
mented that “Japanese at all levels of society embraced the new supreme commander
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[Douglas MacArthur] with an ardor hitherto reserved for the emperor, and com-
monly treated GHQ with the deference they had until recently accorded their own
military leaders” (Dower 1999:227). Thus, the United States, which Japanese could
have blamed for dropping the atom bombs, was shielded from discussion of culpa-
bility and responsibility because of the widespread pro-American sentiments.
As the end of the Occupation approached, however, presentations of “Hiroshima”
began to surface in national public arenas. Articles about the “A-bomb orphan,”
if not the “A-bomb survivor,” appeared a few times in Asahi Shinbun and Yomiuri
Shinbun. These newspaper articles produced an image of robust children who were
growing up after they lost their parents to the atomic bombing. The article about
the Peace Memorial Ceremony in 1951 described A-bomb orphans who attended the
ceremony as “robust,” and the caption of the picture read “A-bomb orphans who
grew big and splendid” (Asahi Shinbun, August 7, 1951). The “A-bomb orphan” was
therefore a symbol of the steady recovery of Hiroshima. This emphasis on recovery
was already present in 1948 when Chugoku Shinbun published the article “Wondrous
Revival of Hiroshima the City of World Peace” (August 1, 1948). Given the na-
tionwide undertaking of postwar reconstruction, most Japanese were eager to leave
behind traumas of the war and look for signs of Japan’s fresh postwar start; they
embraced what historian Carol Gluck calls “a cult of new beginnings” (quoted in
Gillis 1994:12) that helped them forget what had preceded the end of the war.
While the narrative of recovery was dominant, some survivors tried to present their
experiences in national public arenas in the artistic form. In January 1949, Takashi
Nagai published his memoir The Bell of Nagasaki, which became a bestseller of the
year. (By the order of GHQ, his memoir was included in an edited volume that
contained another essay, “The Tragedy of Manila,” a document of the Japanese
military’s atrocities in Manila during the war.) Nagai was a Christian doctor and
narrated his experience of the atomic bombing of Nagasaki and its aftermath in a
dispassionately philosophical tone. He did not discuss any geopolitical causes of the
bombing but exclusively focused on the meaning of the event and human suffering in
universalist and religious terms. This preoccupation with human suffering decoupled
from geopolitics was also characteristic of other works by A-bomb survivors; for
example, such novels as Flower of Summer (1949) by Tamiki Hara, Letters from the
End of the World (1948) by Toyofumi Ogura, and City of Corpses (1948) by Yoko
Ota described human suffering in the aftermath of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima
in isolation from larger historical contexts. Thus, when survivors managed to present
their experiences in public arenas, they did not bring politics into their narratives.
Moreover, the majority of A-bomb survivors remained silent because they did not
have financial and organizational resources to present their experiences in public
arenas. They were struggling against wounds and illnesses caused by exposure to
the atom bomb and barely managed to survive day by day (Hiroshima City and
Nagasaki City 1979). Many survivors also avoided recalling and talking about the
event because they were psychologically traumatized. As psychiatrist Robert Lifton
(1967) painstakingly documented, silence and denial were not uncommon among the
survivors of the atomic bombing (also see NHK Hiroshima Project Team 1986). This
is consistent with the general finding in clinical and psychological studies of the re-
lationship between memory and trauma: survivors of traumatic events are motivated
not to remember their emotionally abhorrent experiences (see McNally, Clancy, and
Barrett 2004, for a review).
In short, through August 1945 to August 1951, there was no national memory
of “Hiroshima.” First of all, GHQ’s censorship kept most Japanese uninformed of
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damages of the atomic bombings; mnemonic representations of “Hiroshima” rarely
appeared in national public arenas. As a result, the problem of commemoration of
the atomic bombing was largely confined to the locality of Hiroshima. Second, most
survivors were unable to present their experiences in public either because of their
medical and psychological conditions or for lack of organizational resources. Com-
memoration of “Hiroshima” was therefore fragmented along the line between citizens
of Hiroshima and the rest of the Japanese. The former constructed a solution of
transnational remembering, which refused to render “Hiroshima” Japanese, whereas
the latter bought into, as it were, a “rebirth frame,” to downplay and even forget
damages of the atomic bombing by emphasizing the recovery of “Hiroshima.” These
two groups engaged in two different sets of commemorative practices in isolation
from each other.
Notably, the transnational commemorative solution implicitly contained seeds of
nationalism of which politicians were conscious. Combining “Hiroshima” with the
new Constitution renouncing war as a sovereign right, Japan could be defined as an
exceptional nation in the world. The politicians did not pursue this nationalization
of “Hiroshima,” however, because they were under censorship and they were also
preoccupied with the more pressing political problem of rebuilding the social and
economic fabric of war-torn Japan. The dominant solution to decouple “Hiroshima”
from geopolitics, then, resulted in the suppression of discussion of responsibility for
the atomic bombing. The a-politicization of “Hiroshima” was undergirded by the
fatalist framing of the atomic bombing and the image of the United States as a
benevolent liberator. These outcomes were going to prove resistant even after the
major political change that was about to take place: the end of the Occupation.
The A-Bomb Maiden and Pity, August 1951–March 1954
The Occupation practically ended when Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty
in September 1951, which subsequently took effect in April 1952. As Japan regained
sovereignty, “Hiroshima” became more visible at the national level. Censorship now
absent, writings and photographs of destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were
rushed into publication: A-Bomb Children (1951), a collection of essays by children
who experienced the atomic bombing, Poems of the Atom Bomb (1952) by Sankichi
Tōge, arguably the best-known “A-bomb poet” from Hiroshima, and A-Bomb Number
1: Photo Documentary of Hiroshima (1952) and Hiroshima: War and City (1952), both
of which collected photos of Hiroshima after the bombing.
Nevertheless, mnemonic representations of “Hiroshima” in these publications re-
mained decoupled from politics. Tōge’s most famous poem “Give Back People”
(1951) is a case in point:
Give back my father, give back my mother
Give grandpa back, grandma back
Give my sons and daughters back.
Give me back myself,
Give back the human race.
As long as this life lasts, this life,
Give back peace
That will never end.3
3This English translation of the poem is available from the website of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial
Museum: http://www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp/virtual/VirtualMuseum e/tour e/ireihi/tour 23 e.html.
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This powerful poem can be said to be the poem of and by the A-bomb victims, for
a monument that inscribed the poem was eventually erected in the Hiroshima Peace
Memorial Park in 1963. His poem used the kind of language that could resonate
with peoples all over the world (e.g., “father” and “mother”). His cry to reclaim
humanity for the A-Bomb dead was directed at the evil of war and the atom bomb,
transcending time, space, and geopolitics.
Among these publications, one nationally distributed magazine called Asahi Graph
made the biggest impact. On August 6, 1952, it published the special issue “The
First Exhibition of A-Bomb Damage,” which showed photographs of the immediate
aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki for the first time since the end of the war.
Japanese were shocked by images of the devastation that the atom bombs had in-
flicted upon the humans and the cities. 520,000 copies were sold out in a single day.
(700,000 copies were sold in total.) This publication of the photos was an important
step toward nationalization of collective memory of “Hiroshima” on two grounds.
First, the photo magazine had a greater carrying capacity than books, the medium
upon which mnemonic representations of “Hiroshima” still heavily relied. It was
more accessible in economic and cultural terms. The contribution of print capitalism
in forging an imagined community lay as much in the production of images as in
that of the print or letters, for images did not require cultural literacy and therefore
could penetrate into nonelite groups of Japanese. Second, the photographic images
gave clearer shape to collective memory (cf. Schwartz 1998). Photos have power to
render memories more tangible because they condense larger historical contexts into
discrete and memorable images (Zelizer 2002). With the publication of the photos,
Japanese audiences came to know more concretely what they should remember about
the atomic bombings: shockingly devastated human bodies against a background of
the scorched wasteland.
My hypothesis is that these documentary photos of the destruction of Hi-
roshima and Nagasaki positioned the viewers as “spectators of the distant suffering”
(Boltanski 1999). Roland Barthes writes that documentary photography establishes
“not a consciousness of the being-there of the thing . . . but an awareness of its
having-been-there. . . its reality that of the having-been-there, for in every photograph
there is the always stupefying evidence of this is how it was, giving us, by a precious
miracle, a reality from which we are sheltered” (1977:44). In other words, as much
as the photos contributed to dissemination of mnemonic representations of the trau-
matic event at the national level, they produced among the viewers the consciousness
that the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki belonged to the distant past (having-
been-there-and-then), not to the present (being-here-and-now). The viewers were thus
positioned as spectators of the past, not actors of the present who shared the vic-
tim’s wound. As Boltanski suggests, “pity” dominates structures of feeling among
spectators. I conjecture that pity and the distance it created between spectator and
sufferer prevented Japanese from actively sympathizing with the A-bomb victims and
redefining their identities in terms of solidarity with their suffering.
In fact, we can detect the feeling of pity in mnemonic representations of
“Hiroshima” during this period. When Japanese began talking about “Hiroshima”
after the end of the Occupation, they focused on one particular group of A-bomb
survivors: young female survivors who were called “A-bomb maidens.” Japanese
publics paid attention to these women because of their keloid (overgrown scar tissue)
and other externally conspicuous wounds. While many A-bomb survivors, whether
men or women, old or young, suffered from keloid and other physical deforma-
tions, only young women were thematized. The situations of these A-bomb maidens
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were presented as tragic because their appearances were destroyed and the possibility
of their happiness in marriage was compromised. The plight of A-bomb maidens
seemed to conjure up the feeling of pity and the element of drama, which caught
attention from large audiences. When volunteers organized activities to provide relief
for A-bomb maidens, they dramatized the activities not only by the imagery of tragic
maidens but also by the involvement of female celebrities. The nationwide fundrais-
ing drive for A-bomb maidens in September 1952, for instance, even exhibited the
festive atmosphere where people were asking the celebrities for autographs (Asahi
Shinbun, September 4, 1952). Thus, Japanese who had not been directly exposed to
the atomic bombing were spectators of the drama of pitiful A-bomb maidens.
Furthermore, the discourse of the “A-bomb maiden” reproduced the logic of re-
vival and the absence of discussion of responsibility. On the one hand, plastic surgery,
which corrected physical deformations (at least temporarily), made an impression that
A-bomb survivors were suffering only from externally visible wounds. The themati-
zation of the “A-bomb maiden” suspended the possibility of comprehensive inquiry
into other A-bomb survivors and illnesses that were less visible than the maidens
and their disfiguring keloid. Again, Japanese focused on what could be reconstructed,
as they had emphasized the recovery of “Hiroshima” previously. For instance, report-
ing the nine A-bomb maidens who came to Tokyo for plastic surgery, the newspaper
article used the caption “may the scar of the A-bomb vanish” (Asahi Shinbun, June 9,
1952) as if treatment of keloid could erase damages of the bomb. On the other hand,
the discourse of the A-bomb maiden perpetuated the absence of discussion of culpa-
bility and responsibility for A-bomb sufferers. Since “pity” dominated structures of
feeling about “Hiroshima” among Japanese, the attempts to treat the A-bomb maid-
ens were seen as voluntary. This is why the A-bomb maidens were “deeply touched”
and expressed their wish to repay their “debt of gratitude” to those who raised funds
for their surgery (Asahi Shinbun, January 16, 1953). The “A-bomb maiden” was dra-
matic and pitiful precisely because she did not demand anything but endured her
fateful suffering in silence.
Around the same time, however, another discourse emerged, which tried to interro-
gate culpability and responsibility for the suffering of the A-bomb survivors. The so-
called Epitaph Dispute was ignited in August 1952 by the Indian judge Radhabinod
Pal, the only judge in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East who had
declared the Japanese wartime leaders not guilty. Accompanied by several city of-
ficials, Pal visited the newly founded monument in the Peace Memorial Park. The
epitaph of the monument read, “Let all the souls here rest in peace; for we shall not
repeat the evil.”4 After his visit, Pal made a remark that while “we” apparently re-
ferred to the Japanese, the evil by those who dropped the atom bomb—Americans—
was yet to be atoned. (In the Japanese original, the subject “we” in the epitaph is
absent as it is conventional in Japanese.) The dominant Japanese response, led by
the mayor of Hiroshima and the author of the epitaph, was that “we” should be
constituted by anybody praying in front of the monument and therefore the whole
of humanity (Chugoku Shinbunsha 1986:81). Here again, the aspiration obviously
persisted to make commemoration of “Hiroshima” transnational without confining
it to national politics.
This insistence on transnational commemoration was strong even among some
A-bomb survivors who decided to bring a lawsuit against the United States in
4This English translation of the epitaph is available from the website of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial
Museum: http://www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp/virtual/VirtualMuseum e/tour e/ireihi/tour 20 e.html.
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January 1954. Their argument was that the atomic bombing violated the rules of
the Hague Tribunal and individual claims for compensation could still exist even af-
ter the Japanese state had discarded its claim in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. But
they took pains to situate their lawsuit transnationally. Their ultimate goal was “to
inform the world of the tragedy of the atom bombs, raise public opinion for their ban,
and promote peace movements” (quoted in Asahi Shinbun, January 9, 1954; trans-
lated by the author). The preceding and ongoing sanctification of “Hiroshima” as a
foundation of peace for entire humanity prevented them from framing “Hiroshima”
as a wedge between Japan and the United States in the field of international politics.
Some Japanese nonsurvivors, however, started framing “Hiroshima” as national
trauma during this period. In newspaper columns and letters to editors, they ex-
pressed their discontent with the dominant American justification for the atomic
bombing, “to save lives of hundreds of thousands of American soldiers.” (This justi-
fication was repeated by President Truman in 1953 as well as by Eleanor Roosevelt
upon her visit to Hiroshima in the same year.) These Japanese contended that the
American justification was tenuous (e.g., Asahi Shinbun, May 29, August 5, 1953).
In criticizing the American justification for the atomic bombing, they argued as if
“Hiroshima” were something uniquely Japanese and important for all the Japanese.
They tried to use “Hiroshima” as a rallying point to create solidarity among Japanese
vis-à-vis culpability of the United States. While “Hiroshima” was still framed pre-
dominantly as transnational during this period, another mnemonic solution emerged
to commemorate “Hiroshima” by conjoining it with Japanese national identity.
This nationalist frame was better articulated in the national political arena. While
Japan was in transition from the Occupation to independence, socialist politicians
accused the ruling party of getting Japan involved in the Cold War by building the
Police Reserve Force and signing the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. In expressing his
concern about Japan’s remilitarization, the leading socialist politician Tetsu Katayama
emphasized the importance of Japan’s voice in preventing the Third World War be-
cause “it was only our Japan that suffered from atom bombs. I believe that we should
announce to the whole world the damages of the atom bombs and those atrocious
conditions of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in every detail, since we were baptized with
the disastrous experience of atom bombs” (15th Lower House Budget Committee
#6, December 3, 1952; translated by the author). Thus, to criticize the ruling party,
opposition parties articulated the uniqueness of Japan: the only country in the world
that experienced the atomic bombing.
In summary, during this period, mnemonic representations of “Hiroshima” came to
be circulated in national public arenas. First and foremost, this change was caused
by the end of the Occupation. Second, presentations of one particular group of
A-bomb survivors—A-bomb maidens—captured the attention of large audiences.
This discourse of the A-bomb maiden focused on their recovery, as the revival of
Hiroshima had been emphasized during the previous period. Moreover, despite their
increased presence in national arenas, mnemonic representations of “Hiroshima” re-
mained decoupled from politics. This was because the transnational remembering
of “Hiroshima” had become a self-reinforcing solution, persisting in the face of in-
stitutional changes, such as the lifting of censorship. The Japanese feeling about
“Hiroshima” in the image of the A-bomb maiden was also structured around pity
rather than sympathy; the feeling of pity did not motivate nonsurvivors to identify
with victims of the atomic bombing. Within this mnemonic environment, a new com-
memorative solution, to remember “Hiroshima” as a defining feature of the Japanese
nation, did not take hold of the majority of Japanese.
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Again, commemoration of “Hiroshima” remained relatively fragmented along the
boundaries of three groups that adopted different solutions to the problem of the
remembering of “Hiroshima”: actors in Hiroshima who continued their transna-
tional commemoration; the minority of Japanese who tried to incorporate the re-
membering of “Hiroshima” into nationalism; the majority of Japanese who fo-
cused on A-bomb maidens and their recovery symbolizing Hiroshima’s. Had it not
been for the accidental presence of one Japanese fishing boat 70 miles away from
Bikini Atoll on March 1, 1954, when the United States tested a hydrogen bomb,
“Hiroshima” would not have become national trauma constitutive of the postwar
Japanese identity. The incident created a moment of “conjuncture,” that is, intersec-
tion of two separate sequences that produced a trajectory either sequence would not
have followed without it (Mahoney 2000:527): the two hitherto independent and frag-
mented solutions of commemoration of “Hiroshima,” transnational and nationalist,
would collide and together produce a new form of commemoration and structure of
feeling.
Discovery of “Hiroshima” as the Foundation of Japanese Nuclear Victimhood,
March 1954–April 1957
Japanese were in shock when Yomiuri Shinbun scooped on March 16, 1954 that the
crew on the tuna fish boat Lucky Dragon 5 had been exposed to the nuclear fallout
in Bikini Atoll. After the tuna were unloaded and distributed to local markets all
over Japan, it was discovered that they contained high levels of radiation. As tuna—
part of the Japanese staple diet—were now exposed to nuclear pollution, people
began to feel that the entire nation was threatened by nuclear weaponry. The fear
of radioactive materials and their threat to Japanese everyday life was pervasive.
Newspapers were relentless in reporting medical conditions of the crew of Lucky
Dragon 5 and objects contaminated by the H-bomb fallout, such as raindrops and
vegetables. Groups of people flooded to Tokyo University Hospital to ask physicians
for medical examination because they had eaten tuna; the so-called tuna horror,
the fear of tuna exposed to radioactivity (“A-bomb tuna”), was widespread. Several
episodes of people who mistook white substances like pollen as H-bomb fallout were
also reported. Public arenas were saturated with narratives and images expressing
fear of nuclear weapons. According to the opinion poll conducted by Asahi Shinbun
(May 20, 1954), 70 percent of the population was afraid of exposure to radioactivity.
While all the crew of Lucky Dragon 5 were being hospitalized for several months,
their conditions were reported methodically as if their suffering were representative
of the entire Japanese nation. When one of the crew, Aikichi Kuboyama, died in
September 1954, it was declared that radioactivity “killed” him. His death made
national news headlines, and delegations of the Japanese government attended his
funeral. Although it is not known whether Kuboyama’s death was caused by radioac-
tivity or by complications of medical treatment, the point is that it was imagined that
the H-bomb fallout “killed” him. As Alexander argues, imagination is “intrinsic to
the very process of representation. It seizes upon an inchoate experience from life,
and forms it, through association, condensation, and aesthetic creation, into some
specific shape” (2004:9). Imagination now gave a coherent shape to the national
identity: the Japanese were victims of nuclear weapons.
Against a backdrop of the Lucky Dragon 5 incident, anti-nuclear movements swept
the archipelago. Between March 18 and October 22, all the 46 prefectural parliaments
passed anti-nuclear resolutions (Hiroshima City 1984:121). A nationwide campaign to
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collect signatures against nuclear weapons also began in August 1954, which was go-
ing to collect more than 30 million signatures within a year. Within these anti-nuclear
movements, Japanese defined “Hiroshima” as the origin of the nation victimized by
nuclear weapons. The phrase “thrice victimized by nuclear bombs” was repeated
in every signature-obtaining campaign against nuclear weapons (see Iwadare 1999:
136–52), referring to the first time Hiroshima and the second time Nagasaki. On
April 1, the Lower House of the Diet passed unanimously a resolution to ban nu-
clear weapons. During the session filled with passionate speeches and loud applause,
Yakichirō Suma, speaking as a presenter of the nonpartisan resolution, capitalized
on the Lucky Dragon 5 incident to articulate the connection between the Japanese,
nuclear victimhood, and anti-nuclear movements: “Since our Japan, among numer-
ous nations, became the first victim of nuclear weaponry, and what is more, has
suffered from it twice and even thrice, I believe that our Japan, as a representative
of humankind, has the noblest rights and the greatest power to speak out in taking
effective measures to save humankind from nuclear destruction and eliminate nuclear
misery as soon as possible (applause)” (19th Lower House Plenary Session #32, April
1, 1954; translated by the author).
In this context, the A-bomb survivor was elevated to the status of a “totem”
(Durkheim 1995), the most sacred (mis)representation of the unity of the Japanese
nation or “the unifying symbol of the Japanese community’s atomic victimhood”
(Orr 2001:38). As the political-socialization literature has shown, people develop their
national identity through identification with a prominent symbolic figure within a
given nation-state; for example, the President in the United States and the Queen in
England (Greenstein 1965; Hess and Easton 1967). In 1954 Japan, such a figure was
the A-bomb survivor. Japanese identified with A-bomb survivors and saw themselves
as nuclear victims. This identification had been absent during the previous periods;
however, it became possible now because the H-bomb fallout enabled Japanese to
take the attitude of the A-bomb sufferer through symbolic interactions in their daily
lives impaired (or so imagined) by nuclear weapons. The A-bomb victim became, as it
were, “the generalized national,” representing “the attitude of the whole [imagined—
H.S.] community [which] influences the behavior of the individuals involved in it and
carrying it on” (Mead 1934:154–55).
Thus, the Lucky Dragon 5 incident produced a critical shift in structures of feeling
about mnemonic representations of A-bomb victims. Sympathy, identification, and
solidarity replaced pity associated with a subject position of spectator of the dis-
tant suffering. Of course, I do not claim that all the Japanese actually sympathized
with the A-bomb victims. My point is that Japanese structures of feeling about “Hi-
roshima” were redefined in terms of sympathy with the A-bomb victims. I argue that
this shift in structures of feeling from pity to sympathy was crucial for nationaliza-
tion of trauma of the atomic bombing. “Hiroshima” as national trauma emerged
when this shift occurred. Members of the national group, who had not been directly
exposed to the traumatic event, came to construct their national identity as an actor,
not a spectator, who sympathized with the victims and shared their suffering. The
tragedy of “Hiroshima” was no longer the distant past of having-been but the present
that urged the group members to take action here and now.
In addition, anti-nuclear rallies and signature-collecting campaigns facilitated dis-
semination of the new structures of feeling about “Hiroshima” among Japanese. They
functioned as occasions for “communitas” (Turner 1969) in which people’s feelings
of togetherness were amplified and their emotional attachment to symbols/images
central to those rallies—representations of A-bomb victims—was reinforced. This
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“anti-nuclear communitas” also suspended cognition of social, political, and eco-
nomic cleavages among Japanese and strengthened their solidarity: “as very large
numbers of persons focus their attention on the same event, are reminded constantly
that other people are focusing their attention by the symbolic signals they give out,
and hence are swept up into a collective mood” (Collins 2004:5).
The Peace Memorial Ceremony on August 6, 1954, five months after the H-bomb
fallout, reflected the new symbolic status of “Hiroshima.” For the first time, members
of the Imperial Family attended the Ceremony, and the local labor unions, which had
been holding their own Peace Rally previously, joined the Ceremony at the Peace
Memorial Park (Hiroshima City 1984:126). For people from the right to the left
in the political spectrum, “Hiroshima” was a nonpartisan, unifying symbol of the
nation. Moreover, while only a few thousands had attended the Ceremony during the
previous years, approximately 20,000 people attended this time (Hiroshima City 1984:
127) and the Ceremony was nationally radio broadcasted. What was notable about
this radio broadcasting of the Ceremony was that it included the moment of silence
at 8:15 a.m., the exact time of explosion of the atom bomb. This simultaneity-of-
trauma-in-time was undergirded by Japan’s peculiar calendar system. Since the Meiji
period, the year has been notated in terms of the imperial era name (instead of the
Anno Domini chronology) in Japan. Accordingly, the year of the atomic bombing of
Hiroshima was almost always remembered as the 20th year of Shōwa (the reign of
Emperor Hirohito), not as 1945; Japanese could situate the tragic event in the unique
narrative sequence and temporal rhythm within the imperial chronology. Thus, the
imperial calendar accentuated the commonality among members of the imagined
community traumatized by the atomic bombing.
This nonpartisan and nationwide effort to commemorate “Hiroshima” as the origin
of Japanese nuclear victimhood culminated in the World Conference Against Atomic
and Hydrogen Bombs on August 6, 1955, which coincided with the 10th anniversary
of the atomic bombing. Representatives of 14 countries and those of 46 prefectures of
Japan attended the conference in Hiroshima, which opened with testimonials by A-
bomb survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On August 8, the conference concluded
with the declaration that included the following passage:
The tragic reality of atomic- and hydrogen-bomb sufferers must be widely known
to the world. We must hasten to save them through worldwide movements. That
is the real foundation for the anti-nuclear movement. Only if atomic and hy-
drogen bombs are banned, we can truly save the sufferers. We plead to the
world that peoples transcend their political, religious, and social differences and
promote anti-nuclear movements ever more vigorously. (reprinted in Iwadare
1999:151–52; translated by the author)
It was now clear that the A-bomb survivor was the core of nuclear victimhood
and the basis of anti-nuclear movements. Although this declaration should not be
interpreted simply as nationalist because it was issued from the world conference,
the participants, who were mostly Japanese, still took for granted the uniqueness
of Japanese nuclear victimhood and its special role in transnational anti-nuclear
movements.
As they became the unifying symbol of the Japanese nuclear victimhood, repre-
sentatives of A-bomb survivors went to the Diet in March 1956 and submitted their
petition to ask for state-sponsored medical treatment for their A-bomb illnesses.
The Japan Socialist Party responded most enthusiastically. One of its politicians,
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Yoshinobu Yamashita, put forward his passionate plea by stating: “It goes without
saying that the devilish atom bombs dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August
of the twentieth year of Shōwa are the worst tragedy of this century” (25th Upper
House Plenary Session #7, November 26, 1956; translated by the author). He pro-
ceeded to discuss situations of A-bomb survivors by using dramatic words, which
culminated in his description of A-bomb maidens: “they cry over their hideous ap-
pearances, lose hope completely, wail bitterly, and hide themselves from the world.”
He then argued that “helping A-bomb survivors is no longer a problem for one
province [Hiroshima and Nagasaki]. Alongside the anti-nuclear movement, it is a
national problem about which all Japanese citizens are earnest with all their hearts.”
Naturally, the Cabinet now should do “everything they can in order to take care of
the A-bomb survivors, pursue the scientific study of A-bomb illnesses, save the sur-
vivors from the atrocity of the devil [the atom bomb], and contribute to the welfare
of entire humanity.” What is notable about his speech is that it elevated the atomic
bombings as “the worst tragedy of this century,” marked Japan’s unique symbolic
status in the world, and emphasized the national mission to contribute to “entire
humanity” under which medical treatment of A-bomb survivors was subsumed.
Cabinet ministers from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party expressed their agree-
ment with the Japan Socialist Party’s position by saying, “we could not help sympa-
thizing sincerely with A-bomb survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki” (25th Upper
House Plenary Session #7 November 26, 1956; translated by the author). Obviously,
this effort to provide medical treatment for A-bomb survivors was nonpartisan. On
December 12, 1956, a resolution concerning treatment of A-bomb survivors was
proposed jointly by the Japan Socialist Party and the Liberal Democratic Party
and adopted unanimously at the Lower House. During discussions of this resolu-
tion, members of the Diet tried to justify the necessity of state-sponsored medical
treatment for A-bomb survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in terms of Japan’s un-
dertaking to become the international leader of anti-nuclear movements and of the
science of biological effects of nuclear weapons upon the human body (25th Lower
House Plenary Session #17, December 12, 1956). They emphasized Japan’s excep-
tional, humanitarian, and pacifist approach to problems of nuclear power against
the backdrop of the escalating Cold War between the United States and the Soviet
Union. Within a territory of the nation-state that embraced, as it were, nuclear-victim
exceptionalism, A-Bomb survivors who were suffering from A-bomb illnesses could
not be neglected without proper examination and treatment. On March 31, 1957,
the A-Bomb Medical Care Bill was passed unanimously in the Diet and took effect
the following day. Thus, the Japanese state finally became part of commemoration of
“Hiroshima” by providing medical care for the A-bomb survivors, who were them-
selves a particular form of memory—living testimonials—of the atomic bombings.
In short, the Lucky Dragon 5 incident radically altered the course of commemo-
ration of “Hiroshima.” During the previous periods, “Hiroshima” had appeared in
national public arenas, but it had been seen as having little to do with Japanese na-
tional identity. The H-bomb fallout in March 1954, however, turned commemoration
of “Hiroshima” into a national problem and created an opportunity for Japanese
to define their identity as nuclear victims. They did seize this opportunity and,
in the process of articulating anti-nuclear nationalism, they elevated “Hiroshima”
to the origin and the core of their nuclear victimhood—national trauma constitu-
tive of Japanese identity. “Sympathy” became dominant in the Japanese structures
of feeling about mnemonic representations of “Hiroshima,” promoting identification
and solidarity with the A-bomb victims. “Hiroshima” became founding trauma or
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nationalist myth, “a story that simplifies, dramatizes and selectively narrates the
story of a nation’s past and its place in the world, its historical eschatology” (Bell
2003:75). The transnational commemorative solution was appropriated in nationalist
terms to bestow on Japan a unique mission in transnational anti-nuclear movements.
This nationalist solution of transnational remembering now emerged as a “master
commemorative frame” (cf. McAdams 1994).5
This dramatic change in commemoration of “Hiroshima” calls into question the
validity of Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi’s theory of multivocal versus fragmented types of
commemoration. According to Vinitzky-Seroussi, a multivocal type of commemora-
tion is
more likely to emerge in a consensual political culture, when the commemorated
past is no longer part of the present agenda, and when agents of memory have
limited power and resources. In contrast, a fragmented type of commemoration
will be engendered in a conflictual political culture, when a strong link exists
between the past and present debates, and in the presence of powerful agents of
memory. (2002: 32)
Although it is hard to say whether Japanese political culture was consensual or
conflictual, commemoration of “Hiroshima” remained a fragmented one through
1945 to 1954 (where different groups engaged in commemoration in isolation from
one another); however, it transformed into a multivocal one after March 1954 (where
heterogeneous groups shared one master commemorative frame, even though they did
not necessarily share identical interpretations of the frame). This change took place
because the commemorated past became part of the present agenda and agents of
memory gained symbolic power and resources.
What differentiates between fragmented and multivocal types of commemoration
may not be a political culture, a link between the past and present debates, or power
of agents of memory. Rather, it seems to depend on whether groups of agents of
memories forge networks of interactions, create feedback loops among the groups,
and consolidate their initially fragmented commemorative practices into a multivocal
yet single frame of commemoration. In the case of commemoration of “Hiroshima,”
it was due to the contingent event: the Lucky Dragon 5 incident enabled interac-
tions among local actors of Hiroshima, Japanese who had not witnessed the atomic
bombing, and political actors of the national level, through nationwide anti-nuclear
movements. As a result, the hitherto-fragmented commemorative practices coalesced
into a master commemorative solution of the nationalist remembering of the transna-
tional Hiroshima.
However, this master commemorative solution created two new problems. The first
problem was the neglect of non-Japanese victims of the atomic bombings. It is esti-
mated that more than 50,000 non-Japanese, including, but not limited to, Koreans,
Chinese, and Americans, have been exposed to the atomic bombings. It was not until
August 1990 that the mayor of Hiroshima referred to the existence of non-Japanese
A-bomb victims and included apologies to Asian peoples in the peace declaration.
The second problem was a corollary to the first: the tendency of commemoration of
“Hiroshima” to deflect discussion of Japan’s wartime aggression in Asia. By setting
“Hiroshima” as the origin of postwar Japan, what had preceded before the bombing
5It is important to note that a master frame itself is always contested because of ongoing dialogic
practices to (re)define the frame from within (Steinberg 1999).
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became less visible. The nationalist appropriation of “Hiroshima” as the heart of
Japan’s nuclear victimhood reinforced the Japanese victim consciousness. As a re-
sult, it became difficult for Japanese to remember that they had victimized Asian
countries during World War II. Put somewhat differently, “it was in the realm of
anti-nuclear pacifism that Japanese war victimhood was most easily detached from
Japanese wartime aggression” (Orr 2001:36).
Here, we are left with a set of new sociological questions. Why was it the early
1990s when Japanese started reconstructing collective memory of “Hiroshima” in
relation to World War II, including Japan’s imperialist-militarist past? What cultural,
social, and political transformations were necessary to bring about this new way of
remembering “Hiroshima?” Did this new commemoration of “Hiroshima” redefine
Japanese national identity? These questions are concerned with the reiterated problem
solving that Japanese continued after April 1957, but I have to leave them to future
research due to limited space.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
This article has traced transformations of commemoration of “Hiroshima” between
1945 and 1957 by utilizing a model of reiterated problem solving and a theory of
cultural trauma. During the first period, 1945–1951 under the Occupation by the
Allied Powers, commemoration of “Hiroshima” was not construed as a national
problem. Registration of “Hiroshima” in Japanese national memory did not occur
because of the censorship by the GHQ, the transnational remembering by the sur-
vivors, and the emphasis on recovery by the rest of the Japanese. Between 1952 and
1954, mnemonic representations of “Hiroshima” began circulating in national pub-
lic arenas in the image of the A-bomb maiden and structured feelings about them
around pity; however, the transnational commemorative solution and the thematiza-
tion of recovery remained dominant. This greater visibility of A-bomb survivors also
led to the emergence of a nationalist commemorative solution to link “Hiroshima” to
Japanese national identity; however, the transnational remembering of “Hiroshima”
persisted as a lock-in path, dominating mnemonic representations of “Hiroshima”
in public. But the contingent event of the H-bomb fallout in March 1954 created a
moment of conjuncture between transnational and nationalist commemorative paths
that had been hitherto independent of each other. This allowed Japanese to articu-
late a new solution to commemoration of “Hiroshima” by conjoining transnational
and nationalist frames: to define “Hiroshima” as Japanese national trauma that be-
stowed upon the Japanese people a unique mission to lead transnational anti-nuclear
movements. This new solution was accompanied by new structures of feeling about
victims of the atomic bombing, sympathy and solidarity with their suffering.
In addition to the analysis of the history of commemoration of “Hiroshima,” the
article offers more general implications for the study of collective memory. First, in-
troduction of reiterated problem solving can enrich our understanding of the history
of collective memory. It helps us examine how solutions to a recurring problem of the
remembering build on one another across different periods of time without losing
sight of subjectivity and agency of actors construing the problem and construct-
ing solutions. Second, a sociopsychological approach offers a point of departure for
multidimensional rapprochement between sociological and psychological approaches
to the study of collective memory. The processual model of “structures of feeling”
that I proposed in this article is a first step to take into account “a wide variety
of mnemonic processes, practices, and outcomes, neurological, cognitive, personal,
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aggregated, and collective” (Olick 1999:346) so as to understand complex processes
of memory construction. Finally, I suggest that it may be rewarding for scholars of
collective memory to pursue the systematic study of social responsibility and po-
litical action revolving around cultural traumas. How does collective memory of a
traumatic event inform discussion of responsibility for trauma and mediate contem-
porary interactions among victims, bystanders, and perpetrators?6 This is a socially
and politically important question. Perhaps, scholars of collective memory and cul-
tural trauma might be able to offer insights into possible ways to change relations
among people caught in the traumatic past toward their desirable interaction in the
present, be it compensation, forgiveness, or reconciliation.
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